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enough... to ground environmental ethics." The concept
of a human community, however, is no more coherent
and robust. By "community" one may refer equally
well to a group of people united by proximity
(neighbors), by ethnicity (Hmong refugees), or by
religion (the community of faith); to a group of
businesses (the banking community); or to a group of
countries (the European Economic Community). And
communities change. The EC, for example, is growing
while COMECON is shrinking. Sociologists describe
and theoretically relate ill-defined, overlapping, and
changing human communities. Ecologists likewise
identify biotic communities of various types and sizes
(ponds, marshes, forests, savannahs, blndras, and so on).
And there is a new and powerful body of theory
hierarchy theory-in ecology devoted to their complex,
many-tiered interrelationships and interactions. So, if
the concept of a human community is coherent and
robust enough to support anthropocentric moral
obligations, as Shrader-Frechette conceded, then the
concept of a biotic community-since no less coherent
and robust-is coherent and robust enough to support
ecocentric moral obligations.
Nowhere do I attempt to "safeguard the interests of
biological communities" as Shrader-Frechette suggests
that I do. I do not think that biological communities
have "interests" or, for that matter, that interest
safeguarding is the be-all and end-all of ethics. Rather,
I argue that biotic communities per se are "morally
considerable," but not by appeaI either to a static "balance
of nature" or to "the diversity-stability hypothesis," as
Shrader-Frechette also alleges. Aldo Leopold, whose
seminal land ethic I elaborate and defend in my book,
specifically rejected the "balance of nature" metaphor
in favor of Charles Elton's trophic pyramid ecological
paradigm. He was, furthermore, for his time,
remarkably cautious and circumspect about the
dependence of stability on diversity. And I am keenly
aware that a quarter cenblry after Leopold's death the
diversity-stability hypothesis became a theoretical
pariah in ecology.
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To have my book, In Defense ofthe Land Ethic,so
thoroughly and perceptively reviewed by so eminent a
philosopher as Kristin Shrader-Frechette flatters me.
Before I say another word, I want to thank her for her
comments, both critical and complimentary, and
especially for defending my environmental phil~y
against Tom Regan's importunate charge that It IS
tantamount to " environmental fascism." I also thank
Between the Species for giving me the opportunity to
append a reply to Shrader-Frechette's review. Generally
put, here it is: All of the complimentary things she says
about the book are true and all the critical things false.
No...seriously... Schrader-Frechette has for the most
part accurately summarized my theory of environmental
ethics and then turned her fonnidable powers of critical
argument against views that I do not hold (as she tacitly
acknowledges: "Callicott and others" is the tip-off
phrase). She has, in short, come to this forum to praise
my philosophy and to bury that of others under a
headstone on which she has carved only my name.
There is one exception to this general tack that I take
in my rejoinder. As much as I would like to accept credit
for "poetic brilliance," I must adjure the compliment.
Holmes Rolston, whose words have recently graced the
pages of this journal, is, as every one knows, the poet
laureate ofenvironmental philosophy. "Poetic" suggests
the associative ambiguity and concrete imagery that
characterize his luxuriant prose. I strive for just the
opposite effect, for univocal and precise abstract
expression (although, ancillary to that, I will confess to
striving also for a lively and readable style). Praising
my work as poetic foreshadows Shrader-Frechette's
inclination in the latter half of her review to attack the
arguments as if they were mine.
In the limited space at my disposal, let me take up
Shrader-Frechette's principal critical points in tum and
set the record straight.
Shrader-Frechette agrees with me that "the
community concept is essential to the notion of moral
obligation," but-because biotic communities are ill
defined, overlap, and change-she insists that "there is
no biologically coherent notion of 'community' robust
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arguing is that ecology represents plants and animals,
soils and waters as our fellow-members of biotic
communities. Thus we ought to feel sympathy for and
good will toward them and toward the community per
se (however narrowly or broadly bounded).
Shrader-Frechette claims that my theory of
environmental ethics is not nonnative. She is right, ifby
"nonnative" one means rationally coercive. If one
think:s of normative ethics as Kant did-as (good)
reason preventing people from doing what their (bad)
feelings incline them to do-then my environmental
ethic will certainly appear to be more descriptive than
nonnative. But the environmental ethic that I defend in
In Defense is "nonnative" in anothtt sense. ''98.6 degrees
Fahrenheit" both describes the usual temperature of
healthy human bodies and provides a norm against which
we measure deviations-fever and hypothermia. In my
view (and here I intend to draw an analogy), moral
norms are to human psychology as medical norms are to
human anatomy and physiology-with one important
difference: they are open to cognitive information, as I
just explained.
Ecology has not so far provided objective norms of
ecosystemic health analogous to the objective norms
of organic health provided by modern medicine.
Shrader-Frechette is right about that. Absent such
norms, environmentalists have measured ecologic
perturbations against a gross and static historical
criterion, "wilderness," the state of nature prior to the
evolution or arrival of the subspecies Homo sapiens
europi. And Shrader-Frechette is also right to point out
that this is incoherent, because change is a natural
condition of ecosystems. I might also add that human
beings are natural creatures, an equally pertinent fact that
Shrader-Frechette (pointedly?) omits to mention. We
are merely one species-though to be sure, one very
precocious species-among millions of others.
Anthropogenic change is therefore as natural as any
other. But because ecology does not provide us with
objective dynamic noons of ecosystemic health, must
we abandon all hope ofan ecology-based environmental
ethic? I think: not; and I submit that in arguing to the
contrary Shrader-Frechette commits the fallacy of
Argumentum ad Ignorantum. Because nineteenth
century medicine was unable to provide norms of
organic health, should we have abandoned all hope of
a science-based medicine and settled for, say, the healing
power of prayer? Twentieth-century ecology is as
immature as nineteenth-century medicine. One of the

This time, I suspect, it is Bryan Norton with whom
I am being confused. Norton has recklessly entered
the scientific debate about the diversity-stability
hypothesis and defends a verion of it in his effort to
provide moral support for the preservation of species.
But I try assiduously to avoid holding my environmental
ethics hostage to any particular ecological claim.
Rather, I argue that ecology is transforming our world
view. Whatever the scientific status of this or that
ecological hypothesis, ecology focuses on the
relationships between organisms and their environmenlS.
Attention to relationships engenders a systemic, holistic
conception of nature which appeals, I argue further, to
our innate moral sensibilities. Actually, I proceed
exactly as Shrader-Frechette concludes that we
environmental philosophers should. I rest my ethical
case on a scientifically informed metaphysics, not on
specific scientific hypotheses. (In fact, one of my essays
in the very book: under review is entitled "The
Metaphysical Implications of Ecology.")
Shrader-Frechette's critique of my evolutionary
construction of ethics is hard for me to understand, let
alone rebut That is because she saddles me with an
ethical permutation of "evolutionary epistemology"
something with which I am wholly unacquainted and
certainly upon which I do not model my evolutionary
account of ethics. Her most fundamental misrepresen
tation of my evolutionary account of ethics is her
assumption that I treat ethics (just as the evolutionary
epistemologists treat lcnowledge, Iguess) as analogous
to evolution ("the ethics: evolution analogy'). But I
nowhere suggest that ethics and evolution are analogous.
Rather I endorse Darwin's simple and straightforward
evolutionary argument that we current editions of Homo
sapiens inherit tender and refined but indeterminate
"moral sentiments" (as, following Hume and Smith, he
called them) because the inclusive fitness of our
protohuman ancestors was enhanced by social
integration, which mutual moral restraint enabled them
to achieve. 1be moral sentiments however are not blind,
unerring instincts; they are open-ended feelings lik:e
sympathy, good will, beneficence, and so on. I argue,
accordingly, that nature (evolution) outfits us with a
plastic capacity for ethics but that to whom we owe
what is shaped by nurture (culture). I quite agree, nay,
I would indeed be the first to insist that our altruistic
feelings must be informed by "hypotheses about the
facts" and by "cognitive and evaluative aims" to be both
actual and properly ethical. After all, what I am basically
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most fruitful and important research opportunities for
twenty-first century ecology is the development of
objective norms for the health of dynamic ecosystems.
Once formulated, such norms might tentatively
govern our environmental behavior. Ecology will never
be a science more exact than medicine. So we should
always be prepared to change our notions of what is
good for nature, just as we are prepared to change our
notions of what is good for our bodies. But again,
environmental philosophy should not concern itself with
formulating and reformulating specific norms of
environmental health and integrity. That is a job for
ecologists. We philosophers should busy ourselves,
rather, with connecting ecological "facts" (Le.,
ecological hypotheses and theories) with values, and
with trying to show, as I do in my book, that it is no less
incumbent upon us to be solicitous of the health and
integrity (however tentatively defmed) of (changing,
evolving) biotic communities than of the health and
integrity of (changing, aging) human persons and of
(changing, developing) human societies.

Biology and Ethics:
Callicott Reconsidered
Kristin Schrader-Frechette
University of South Florida
Professor Callicott's reply to my analysis of his
claims reminds me of my favorite philosophical
exchange, a conversation penned by Lewis Carroll.
"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said to Alice,
"it means just what I choose it to mean-neither more
nor less." But, as Alice reminded him, "The question
is... whether you can make words mean so many
different things. "I This is precisely my question to
Professor Callicott. Can you make words-like
"evolution," "community," and "norm,"-mean so
many different things, claiming one meaning in one
argument, and an incompatible meaning in another?
In his "Reply," Professor Callicott states: "I nowhere
suggest that ethics and evolution are analogous." Yet.,
as I quoted in my review, Callicott claims: The
"conceptual and logical foundations of the land ethic"
are a "Darwinian protosociobiological natural history
of ethics, Darwinian ties of kinship among all forms of
life on earth.... Its logic is that natural selection has
endowed human beings with an affective moral
response to perceived bonds of kinship and community
membership and identity."2 Value "in the philosophical
sense," says Callicott, "is a newly discovered proper
object of a specially evolved "publick affection" or
"moral sense" which all psychologically normal human
beings have inherited from a long line of primates."3 It
is logically inconsistent for Callicott to claim that
evolution and natural selection provide the foundations
of the land ethic, then, once someone points out the
problematic logical consequences of this position, to
deny espousing evolutionary ethics.
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